{
  "draft": "draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ta-tiebreaker-06",
  "doc_id": "RFC10097",
  "title": "Tiebreaking Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchors",
  "authors": [
    "J. Snijders",
    "T. Buehler",
    "T. de Kock"
  ],
  "format": [
    "XML",
    "TEXT",
    "HTML",
    "PDF"
  ],
  "page_count": "6",
  "pub_status": "PROPOSED STANDARD",
  "status": "PROPOSED STANDARD",
  "source": "SIDR Operations",
  "abstract": "A Trust Anchor (TA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is represented by a self-signed X.509 Certification Authority (CA) certificate. Over time, Relying Parties (RPs) may have acquired multiple different issuances of valid TA certificates from the same TA operator. This document specifies a tiebreaking scheme to be used by RPs to select one TA certificate for certification path validation. This document updates RFC 8630.",
  "pub_date": "November 2026",
  "keywords": [
    "RPKI",
    "Routing Security",
    "BGP",
    "X.509"
  ],
  "obsoletes": [],
  "obsoleted_by": [],
  "updates": [
    "RFC8630"
  ],
  "updated_by": [],
  "see_also": [],
  "doi": "10.17487/RFC10097",
  "errata_url": null
}